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It is common ground that parties usually prefer to arbitrate rather than litigate largely because 
arbitration facilitates resolution of their disagreements in a neutral forum and by persons who have 
expertise in the relevant areas of law1. By selecting arbitration, they also wish to settle the conflicts in 
an inexpensive and swift manner. With these purposes in mind, parties insert arbitration agreements 
into their contracts with the expectation that there will be no delays in obtaining an award, nor any 
obligation to fight all the way to the highest appellate level court for a binding award. In this context, a 
“full scale litigation”2, where the judicial review of the arbitration award is made is usually viewed as 
running counter to what the parties have bargained for. 
    
Nonetheless, it is also true to say that in order to ensure that arbitration is not tainted by undue 
process, parties should also be given the chance of challenging the arbitration award. While this step 
may be necessary in order to safeguard that arbitration procedure is carried out properly, asking the 
national courts to vacate or modify the award may be costly and time-consuming. In this respect, it is 
common ground that the likelihood of a delay in the finalisation of an arbitration award is principally 
embedded in the laws of the country or state wherein the award is made3. Premising on the fact that 
swiftness, cost and efficiency of arbitration is usually dependent on this matter, it is not surprising to 
see well-advised parties exercising a great amount of caution in selecting the seat of arbitration, whilst 
entering into an international commercial contract.   
 
Having accepted the importance of the seat of arbitration and the arbitration regime adopted in 
different jurisdictions, particular inquiry needs to be made so as to find the answer to a number of key 
questions: Do the respective laws of the countries envisage judicial review when the courts are asked 
to confirm, vacate or modify the award? If so to what extent? Recognition of judicial review has 
significance for parties inasmuch as judicial review procedures may not only cause serious delays in 
obtaining a binding award, but also increase the costs of obtaining the same. Another disadvantage 
lies under the fact that, with the agreement to arbitrate, the parties seek to bypass litigation, due to the 
well-grounded belief that in many countries this process takes longer than arbitration. For this very 
reason, when the national courts retain the right to review the award, parties’ chances of 
circumventing the long litigation procedures become rather low, and the underlying purpose of 
selecting arbitration may be frustrated considerably.  
 
Against this background, this paper will examine and analyse the respective arbitration acts of 
England and the U.S. with a view to determining which one of the jurisdictions provides a better 
system for confirmation, vacation and modification of arbitration awards. In order to attain this 
objective, the central issues will be whether judicial review is adopted in any of these jurisdictions, and 
if so, whether this adversely affects the speed and costs of arbitration. Consequently, in the first 
section, the US Federal Arbitration Act will be examined in order to determine the answer to the 
                                                            
1 Margaret L. Moses, “The principles and practice of international commercial arbitration”, (Cambridge University 
Press 2008), 1 
2 Ibid, 4 
3 For American law, see 9 U.S.C. § 9, for English law, see section 2 of the Arbitration Act, 1996  
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former question. In this respect, particular attention will be paid to the recent Supreme Court decision 
in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel Inc4, inasmuch as the ruling has made a drastic impact on this 
matter. In this section, it will be concluded that the U.S. law does not recognise judicial review for 
error of law, and the U.S court’s reliance on the “manifest disregard of law” as a ground for the 
vacation of an award has now considerably reduced with the highlighted decision.  
 
In the second section, the legal position under English law will be examined in light of the UK 
Arbitration Act. As a consequence, the paper will reveal the fact that the English approach pertaining 
to this issue is strikingly different from that in the U.S. law, as the English courts still retain the right to 
review the award for error of law.  After setting forth the parties’ positions in both jurisdictions, which 
jurisdiction is favourable for the parties seeking to arbitrate with less costs and delays will be 
discussed.  
SECTION 1 - IS JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS PERMISSIBLE IN THE US 
LAW? 
 
The explanations made in this section will underpin the argument that, in light of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, the U.S. courts are not principally conferred with the right to re-consider and decide on 
the legal points which have already been determined in arbitration5. Nor is there an appeal 
mechanism for error of law. Rather, the act envisages “strictly limited” grounds for judicial review in 
order to render the arbitration mechanism “efficient and cost-effective”6. At the heart of this approach 
lies the “strong presumption … in favour of enforcing arbitration awards”7. In particular, this peculiarity 
has been intensified with the Supreme Court decision in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel Inc, which 
raised two key suggestions that have gained wide acceptance across the U.S. courts. As a starting 
point, suffice it to say that review of arbitration awards is very limited in order not to frustrate the 
foremost goals of arbitration, namely effective settlement of disputes, inexpensive and swift 
arbitration8. 
The first point to be made is that, under the Federal Arbitration Act, the parties are not compelled to 
resort to the courts for confirmation of the arbitration award. Rather, such obligation arises only where 
they stipulate in the arbitration agreement that the award will be final and binding insofar as it is 
confirmed by the court wherein the award is made or by any other court chosen by the parties9. It is 
clear in the U.S. law that the court so selected will confirm the award where the application for an 
order confirming the award is made within one year after the award is made, unless it is vacated, 
modified or corrected pursuant to sections 10 and 11 of the Act10. The U.S courts are also guided by 
these particular sections when one party institutes an action to require vacation, modification or 
correction of the arbitration award.  
                                                            
4 128 S.C.t 1396 (2008) 
5 India v. Cargill Inc, 867 F.2d 130, 133, (2d Cir. 1989) 
6 Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476 F.3d 278, 280 (5th Cir. 2007); Bowen v. 
Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 931 (10th Cir. 2001) 
7 Brentwood Medical Associates v. United Mine Workers, 396 F.3d 237, 241 (3d Cir. 2005) 
8 Telenor Mobile Communications AS v. Storm LLC, 584 F.3d 396, 405, (2d Cir. 2009)  
9 See 9 U.S.C §9 
10 Ibid. See also, Global Reinsurance Corporation of America v. Argonaut Insurance Company, 634 F.Supp. 2d 
342, 348,  (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
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In a suit to vacate an award, the U.S. courts consider section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act, which 
envisages the grounds for vacating the award. In pursuant thereof, the courts will vacate the award 
inter alia in cases where it is made by corruption, fraud or any other undue means11 or where there is 
an obvious impartiality or corruption on the part of any one of the arbitrators12. Another decisive factor 
leading to the vacation of the award is the decisions of arbitrators which prejudice the rights of parties 
by conducting an improper behaviour, such as rejecting to delay the hearing despite a sufficient 
reason to do so being shown, or refusing to admit evidence which is relevant for the resolution of the 
dispute13. Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act also provides that the courts may vacate the award 
where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and 
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made”14.  
 
When the defect in the arbitration process does not go so far as to justifying vacation of the award, 
the Federal Arbitration Act entitles the courts to modify or correct the award. Under section 11 of the 
Act, the awards which contain “an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material 
mistake in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award” can be modified or 
corrected upon the application of any party to arbitration15.   
 
The section also enables modification and rectification of the awards involving decisions over the 
matters which are not referred to arbitration, provided that these decisions affect the merits of the 
findings on the issues which are actually submitted to arbitration16. Finally, the section makes it 
possible for an arbitration award to be modified, where it is “imperfect in matter of form not affecting 
the merits of the controversy”17.  
Availability of the test of “manifest disregard of law” under the U.S. law 
Due to the pervasive fear that arbitrators may wilfully ignore applying the law, the U.S. case law 
introduced an additional factor, namely “manifest disregard of law” which led to vacation of the award. 
It is important to note that, in a number of cases, the courts reiterated that this ground only gave rise 
to vacation of the award but not modification of the same18. Being hostile to modification in such 
cases was predicated on the arbitration regime enshrined in the Federal Arbitration Act, which does 
not leave room for the U.S. courts to re-consider and decide the legal issues which have already been 
decided by the arbitrators.  
 
For this very reason,  the term “manifest disregard of law” was not crudely defined. In the absence of 
statutory guidance,  only  the findings of arbitrators “which are more than error or misunderstanding of 
law” were regarded by case law as falling into this concept19.  With regard to this issue, the decision in 
                                                            
11 9 U.S.C § 10(a) 1 
12 9 U.S.C § 10(a) 2 
13 9 U.S.C § 10(a) 3 
14 9 U.S.C § 10(a) 4 
15 9 U.S.C § 11(a) 
16 9 U.S.C § 11(b) 
17 9 U.S.C § 11(c) 
18 See NCR Corp. v. Sac-Co, Inc., 43 F.3d 1076, 1080 (6th Cir. 1995). See also, H.G. Gharavi, “The International 
Effectiveness of the Annulment of an Arbitral Award, (Kluwer Law International 2002), 94 and J.G. Merrills, 
“International Dispute Settlement”, (Cambridge University Press 2005), 115, 116.  
19 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986) 
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the Duferco International Steel Trading v. T.Klaveness Shipping A/S20 was illustrative, as the court 
therein identified three main conditions to be satisfied in order to hold that there is a manifest 
disregard of law. Firstly, the law should be clear with regard to the relevant issue. Secondly, the 
arbitrator should [have] applied the law inappropriately and in a way to reach an erroneous result. 
Thirdly, there should be evident ignorance on the part of the arbitrator regarding the applicability of 
the law to the problem.     
 
Vacation of arbitration awards which exhibit manifest disregard of law was sought to be narrowed by 
the U.S. courts. This was largely because failure to do so would greatly undermine the foremost 
peculiarity of the arbitration regime under the Federal Arbitration Act, which does not as a principle 
give the courts the right to review the award for error of law. Therefore application of this rule was 
restricted to “those exceedingly rare instances where some egregious impropriety on the part of the 
arbitrators is apparent”21. While different interpretations of the law were not regarded as qualifying for 
this purpose22, the intentional refusal of the arbitrator to apply the law appropriately was held to be a 
manifest disregard in New York Telephone Co. v. Communications Workers of America Local 110023. 
The decision of the court was predicated on the fact that the arbitrator therein explicitly demonstrated 
his intention not to follow the precedent by saying “perhaps it is time for a new court decision”24.  
 
With all this relevant background, Supreme Court decision in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel Inc, had 
no doubt that manifest disregard of law was viewed as a reason for vacating the award, and that this 
rule was widely recognised. However, this concept was developed under case law and therefore was 
not one of those grounds listed in section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act as a ground for vacating 
the award. This fact cast doubt on the availability of this ground in the wake of the recent decision of 
the Supreme Court in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel Inc, which inter alia held that the grounds 
enlisted under sections 10 and 11 of the Federal Arbitration Act were exclusive25. Consequently, 
inasmuch as no ground other than those stated thereunder could be used to vacate, modify or correct 
the arbitration awards, a further question, of some difficulty, inevitably arose: Is the non-statutory 
ground of “manifest disregard of law” still a ground for vacation of arbitration awards? 
 
The Supreme Court in that case seemed to have given an affirmative answer to this question, stating 
that “Maybe the term “manifest disregard” was meant to name a new ground for review, but maybe 
referred to the § 10 grouds collectively, rather than adding to them… Or, as some courts have 
thought, “manifest disregard” may have been shorthand for §10(a)(3) or §10(a)(4), the subsections 
authorizing vacatur when the arbitrators were “guilty of misconduct” or “exceeded their powers”. This 
statement, which was then echoed in a great number of cases, has led many circuits to adopt a 
receptive approach towards the application of this doctrine by treating this term as a “judicial gloss on 
the specific grounds for vacatur enumerated in section 10 of the FAA, [and therefore] remains a valid 
ground for vacating arbitration awards”26. Consequently, in the post-Hall Street position, some circuits 
                                                            
20 333 F.3d 383, 389-390 (2d Cir. 2003) 
21 Ibid, at 389 quoting India v. Cargill Inc, 867 F.2d 130, 133, (2d Cir. 1989) 
22 Westerbece Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co. Ltd, 304 F.3d 200, 214 (2d Cir. 2002)  
23 256 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2001) 
24 Ibid, 91 
25 M. Mangan, “With the globalisation of arbitral disputes, is it time for a new Convention”, (2008) Int. A.L.R, 137-
138.  
26 Stolt-Nielsen SA v. Animal Feeds International Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S.Ct. 
2793 (2009); Telenor Mobile Communications, 584 F.3d 396, 407 (2d Cir. 2009); Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv 
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re-conceptualised this term, which was previously treated as a non-statutory ground and a “judicially 
created” addition to the grounds enlisted in the Federal Arbitration Act”, in order to keep it effective27. 
By way of contrast, some circuits refused this re-conceptualisation, and viewed the doctrine of 
manifest disregard of law as no longer applicable28, while others merely raised doubt as to the 
existence of the rule29. 
 
Since an arbitrator’s conduct of manifestly disregarding the law can be described either as acting in 
excess of his powers or as being guilty of misconduct, there are weightier reasons to suggest that this 
doctrine should still be applicable. It therefore follows that a sounder approach is to subsume the 
concept either under §10(a)(3) or under §10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act. It is important to 
subsume the concept in one of these subsections given that the grounds for judicial review are 
accepted as exclusive in the wake of The Hall Street decision. Can the concept be more appropriately 
considered as falling under §10(a)(3) or under §10(a)(4)? It remains to be seen whether the U.S. 
Courts will give preference to one subsection over the other when seeking to bring the concept within 
the statutory grounds for judicial review.  
 
Nonetheless, it is evident that, whether the test of manifest disregard of law is still applicable or not, 
parties may not view all these identified grounds as sufficient to ensure the appropriate flow of the 
arbitration process. With this in mind, parties may wish to insert additional grounds into their 
respective arbitration agreements which they think could justify vacation or modification of the award 
in order to enable the national courts to extend their right to review. In this context, they may add, for 
instance, arbitrator’s misinterpretations on the points of law into the list of grounds for judicial review. 
Their attempts raise two critical questions: Could the grounds for vacation, modification and correction 
of the arbitration awards as enunciated under sections 10 and 11 of the Federal Arbitration Act be 
extended in a way to give relief to the parties disappointed by the merits of the arbitration award?  
Taking this one step further, could the courts review the award and decide the merits of the dispute in 
cases where there is an arbitration agreement entitling the courts do so? 
 
After the decision in Hall Street, it can scarcely be argued that an affirmative answer could be given to 
any of the questions, inasmuch as the ruling made it clear that the non-statutory grounds cannot be 
relied on30. The court justified the restrictive reading of the relevant section under the ejusdem generis 
rule, which favours interpretion of the provisions as comprising only those items, which are within 
scope of the generic provided in the general term31. Another justification for the finding was made in 
light of the underlying history of the Federal Arbitration Act. Consequently, the conclusion was sought 
to be supported both with purposive and historical interpretations of the relevant sections. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
West Associations, 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 145 (2009); Martin Marietta 
Materials, Inc. v. Bank of Oklahoma, 304 Fed. Appx. 360, 362, (6th Cir. 2008) 
27 Ibid. 
28 Citigroup Global Markets Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 355 (5th Cir. 2009); Andorra Services Inc. v. Venfleet 
Ltd, 2009 WL 4691635, 4 (3d Cir. 2009); Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Services, 524 F.3d 120, 124, (1st Cir. 
2008) 
29 Grain v. Trinity Health, Mercy Health Services Inc., 551 F.3d 374, 380 (6th Cir. 2008) 
30 The Householder Group v. Thomas Caughran, 2009 WL 4016450, 1 (5th Cir. 2009) 
31 128 S.Ct. 1396, 1405 (2008)  
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Although this approach could be deemed to have been widely recognised, the Supreme Court of 
California in Cable Connection Inc. v. Directv Inc. did not, however, follow this path32. The departure 
from the ruling in Hall Street was predicated on the fact that the arbitration award was conducted in 
California under the California Arbitration Act. Most importantly, the court therein raised the argument 
that the Federal Arbitration Act does not debar application of other state law grounds for judicial 
review. Given that the California Arbitration Act enforces the arbitration agreements providing for 
judicial review for error of law, the court set aside the award for error of law. Accordingly, the court did 
not ask the parties to adhere to the grounds for challenge under the U.S. Federal Arbitration Act, 
which does not envisage judicial review for error of law. Hence, in reliance of the California Arbitration 
Act, the court upheld the parties’ arbitration agreement providing for a judicial review for legal errors. 
 
Consequently, it remains to be seen whether other state courts will try to give some flexibility to the 
rule in the Hall Street. It is evident that the rule in some way restricts parties’ freedom of contract in 
order to ensure expeditious and cost effective arbitration by limiting the hurdles against enforcement 
of the awards. However, this fact itself makes it difficult to support the rigidity, when the parties wish to 
compromise those identified objectives and prefer to ensure that the merits of the award is in 
accordance with the law applicable to the dispute In this respect, this peculiarity also raises the 
question of whether the U.S. arbitration regime is an effective substitute for litigation. In light of the 
explanations made thus far, it can be stated that the U.S. approach enables the parties to have 
effective, inexpensive and swift arbitration procedure. However, whether these peculiarities could 
render the arbitration regime adopted under the U.S. law as such will be discussed in the conclusion.  
The suggestion made in the above paragraph is supported by the fact that the Federal Arbitration Act 
permits judicial review only in the restricted circumstances, and the parties are principally not allowed 
to contract around this limitation. The only possibility of having a relief for the errors of law in the 
award arises in cases where the error rises to the level of manifest disregard of law, i.e. where it is not 
a mere error in law. Since a number of circuits recognise application of this concept even after the 
decision in Hall Street, it cannot be argued that the U.S. courts do not in any case interfere with the 
merits of the award. However, such cases become relevant in highly unusual circumstances and this 
fact therefore does not break the general pattern.  
Having analysed the U.S. law governing this issue, in the next section, this issue will be examined in 
light of the UK Arbitration Act.  
 
SECTION 2 - POSSIBILITY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE UK ARBITRATION ACT 
 
This section will reveal that the English arbitration regime is rather different from that of the United 
States. The reason is mainly that the English Arbitration Act allows parties to appeal for error of law. 
For judicial review of arbitration awards for error of law, parties do not need an express provision in 
their arbitration agreement to that effect. This is in sharp contrast with the position under the U.S. law, 
where the grounds of appeal under the Federal Arbitration Act are treated as exclusive and cannot be 
increased by contract. The explanations above will support the proposition that this mechanism has 
adverse effects on the duration and cost of arbitration. Nonetheless, a number of suggestions will be 
raised in the last section in order for the parties to minimise these effects. 
 
To start with, it is necessary to note that the English Arbitration Act allows the parties to contract out 
the right to appeal for the errors of law.33Nonetheless, the act does not allow them to opt out the 
                                                            
32 44 Cal. 4th 1334, 190 P.3d 586    
33 s.69(1) of the Arbitration Act 1996. 
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provisions on the challenge of arbitration awards based on the procedural defects, namely want of 
jurisdiction and serious irregularity34. Another point to be made is that the grounds for challenge of an 
award and the appeal mechanism are available where the seat of arbitration is in England, Wales or 
in Northern Ireland. Where this is the case, the act envisages three main grounds for the challenge of 
an award, namely, want of jurisdiction35, serious irregularity36 and error of law37. In order for a party to 
challenge the award on any of these grounds, there are three certain criteria that need to be satisfied. 
Firstly, under section 70(2)(a) of the act, the applicant is under an obligation to exhaust all the internal 
remedies within the arbitration process. Secondly, under section 70(2)(b) of the act, the applicants 
should also have exhausted their rights to demand rectification of the award due to any clerical error 
or ambiguity under section 57 of the act. Thirdly, there is a 28-day time bar to raise any challenge, 
and this starts from the date of the award or of the date when the applicant was informed about the 
outcome of the internal arbitral appeal or review.  Having analysed the general requirements of 
challenging the awards as per the UK Arbitration Act, the identified grounds will now be examined and 
treated separately.  
Lack of Jurisdiction 
For a party to set aside an award on this ground, they need to establish that arbitrators do not have 
the substantial jurisdiction to hear the case. In determining whether the arbitrators possess 
jurisdiction, the courts are guided by section 30 of the Act, which identifies three conditions to be met: 
Firstly, there should be a valid arbitration agreement. Secondly, there should be an appropriate 
constitution of the tribunal. Thirdly, all the conflicting issues should be submitted to arbitration in 
accordance with parties’ agreement.  
 
It is striking that the restrictions on challenging the arbitration awards for want of jurisdiction manifests 
the intention not to allow parties to delay in reaching the final and binding award. In order to protect 
the arbitration process against undue judicial intervention and delays, section 67(2) of the act permits 
the tribunal to continue the arbitral proceedings and make further rulings when the issue as to 
jurisdiction is pending. This intention of the legislator was also made explicit in paragraph 277 of the 
DAC report, which reads: “to avoid possibility of challenges to the jurisdiction causing unnecessary 
delay, the rights given by this clause are subject to qualifications…”  
Serious Irregularity 
As has been highlighted in the DAC report, it may in some cases be difficult to draw a line between 
the grounds of serious irregularity and lack of jurisdiction, inasmuch as lack of jurisdiction usually 
renders the procedure defective. Nonetheless, the act contains individual provisions for these grounds 
largely because the test of “substantial injustice” was sought to be made exclusively available to the 
challenges on the basis of serious irregularity. Accordingly, presence of any one or more of the 
following issues will be deemed to have given rise to “serious irregularity” within the meaning of the 
act, provided that they cause “substantial injustice” to the applicant38: 
 
(1) Tribunal’s failure to act fairly and impartially, not giving both parties reasonable opportunity to 
put their respective cases 
(2) Tribunal’s failure to adopt appropriate procedures which prevent unnecessary delays or costs 
                                                            
34 See paras 276 and 283 of the Departmental Advisory Committee Report (hereinafter “DAC Report”)  
35 s. 67  
36 s. 68  
37 s. 69 
38 s. 68 of the act 
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(3) Failure on the part of the tribunal or any other institution, or person to act within the authority 
given by the parties or by this act in relation to the proceedings or the award 
(4) Failure by the tribunal to carry out the arbitration proceedings pursuant to the procedure 
stipulated in the parties’ arbitration agreement 
(5) Failure by the tribunal to consider all the issues brought thereto39 
(6) Effect of the arbitration award being ambiguous or uncertain  
(7) Presence of fraud or violation of public policy in the way the award is obtained 
(8) Tribunal’s failure to observe the requirements with regard to the form of award or any 
irregularity in the proceedings or in the award which is admitted by the tribunal, or by any 
other institution or person authorised by the parties regarding the proceedings or the award 
 
While the grounds as spelled out thereunder cannot be extended by the courts, the wording of the 
provision, namely one or more of the following kinds, suggests that the section does not give an 
exhaustive list of grounds of serious irregularity. Nonetheless, it calls for interpretation under the 
ejusdem generis rule. Most importantly, when deciding whether these irregularities have caused the 
applicant “substantial injustice”, the courts are not allowed to take into account what would have 
happened to the applicant, had the dispute been litigated40. Instead, the court is required to reach a 
conclusion by considering what could reasonably be expected of the arbitration process41. There 
follows that when the conclusion reached in arbitration is different from what would have been 
decided in litigation, the courts are not allowed to interfere with the ruling of the tribunal as long as it is 
“an acceptable consequence of that choice”. This approach underlines the legislator’s efforts to 
protect arbitration procedures against undue judicial intervention, since the agreement to arbitrate 
attests the parties’ intention to resolve their conflicts by arbitration. When arbitration is tainted with 
serious irregularity within the meaning of the act, the court may remit the award or set aside the same. 
As an alternative to these two options, the court may decide that the award is of no effect.   
  
With respect to the right to challenge an award on lack of jurisdiction and serious irregularity, the Act 
1996 introduces a statutory waiver mechanism42. Accordingly, there are two ways of losing the right to 
make a challenge on these grounds. These include being involved in the arbitration process without 
raising any objections to lack of jurisdiction or serious irregularity43. Such is the strictness of this rule 
that it finds room for application, unless the parties establish that at the time they were involved in the 
process they did not know and could not reasonably have known the reasons for the objection44. In 
addition, parties will lose the right to challenge pursuant to section 67 or 68 of the English arbitration 
act, where they fail to exhaust the arbitral process which is available for objection to the tribunal’s 
decision on jurisdiction or where they do not challenge the award within the period allowed either in 
the arbitration agreement or in the act45.  
                                                            
39 See London Underground Ltd. v. City Link Telecommunications Ltd, [2007] EWHC 1749, which provides that 
this assessment requires an analysis of the substance of arbitration and its conduct viewed as a whole”.  Most 
importantly, the mere fact that the arbitrator has made factual decisions which are different from what the parties 
contented is not sufficient for the court to hold in favour of “serious irregularity”.  
40 See para 280 of the DAC Report on the Arbitration Bill 
41 Ibid. 
42 s. 67 
43 s. 73(1)  
44 Ibid. 
45 s. 73(2) 
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Appeal on point of law 
While the grounds identified thus far are similar to those adopted under the U.S. law, it is clear that 
this ground creates the major difference between the arbitration regimes in these jurisdictions. In 
contrast to the U.S Federal Arbitration Act, which does not allow the courts to review the award on the 
point of law, unless there is a manifest disregard of law46, the English Arbitration Act 1996 recognises 
judicial review for error of law.  
 
In the drafting process, there has been a number of discussions as to the adoption of judicial review 
for error of law47. In this context, it was suggested that whether the court would reach a different 
conclusion should be regarded as irrelevant whilst deciding as to the finality of the award, since 
arbitration agreements demonstrate parties’ intention to observe the decision of the tribunal48. 
Nonetheless, the legislator found it necessary to retain this ground in order to ensure that arbitrators 
correctly apply English law. Consequently, when the law applicable to the dispute is not English law, 
parties cannot appeal to English courts for error of law.  
 
Most importantly, for a party to obtain permission to appeal, certain criteria need to be met. First of all, 
the court needs to be satisfied that the decision of the arbitrator on a legal point is evidently wrong49. 
In this context, in a recent case, it was highlighted that the test is not based on the probable 
conclusion of a court but on the expected ruling of a reasonable arbitrator50. This finding has its roots 
in the House of Lords decision in The Nema which suggests that the court should accept the ruling of 
the arbitrator where unless it is established that the arbitrator “misdirected himself in point of law”, or 
the decision is contrary to the possible finding of a reasonable arbitrator51. Moreover, for the purposes 
of finding whether there is actually an evident error of law, the error needs to be established swiftly 
and without any need for long explanations on the point of law52.  
 
When the issue has general public importance, the applicant’s burden is alleviated in that merely 
showing that the award is open to serious doubt is agreed to be sufficient53. The historic reason for 
recognition of this proposition can also be traced back to the House of Lords decision in The Nema 
where one of the foremost questions of law was interpretation of a non-standard clause in a 
contract54. The House of Lords therein suggested that where the legal question concerns with 
interpretation of a standard contract or a clause and where the legal position with respect to this issue 
is not clear and certain, there is a public interest in clarifying the law in order to promote certainty in 
                                                            
46 However it is doubtful whether this test is still applicable after the decision in the Hall Street Associates v. 
Mattel Inc, see section (1) hereof.  
47 Para 284 of the DAC Report on the Arbitration Bill 
48 Ibid. 
49 s. 69(3)(c)(i) of the act  
50 London Underground Ltd. v. City Link Telecommunications Ltd, [2007] EWHC 1749 
51 [1982] A.C. 724, 739-740 
52 Garden Co. Ltd. v. Onn Lee General Contractors [1996] ADRJ 71 quoted in Robert Merkin, “Arbitration Law”, 
(LLP 2004) para 21.43 
53 s. 69(3)(c)(ii) of the act 
54 [1982] A.C. 724  
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commerce55. Accordingly, the court adopted the view that there is a public importance in elucidating 
the law as to the interpretation of a particular standard contract which is heavily used and relied on by 
the parties in trade. Most importantly, in order to obtain a permission for appeal, the House of Lords 
held that “leave should not be given, unless the judge considered that a strong prima facie case had 
been made out that the arbitrator had been wrong in his construction”56.  
 
While observing the strong prima facie case rule, the courts rejected to formulate the answer to the 
question of how strong the case should be. Rather, it was accepted that the degree of strength 
depends on the factual circumstances of each case and there is no fixed method to employ57.  
 
After the 1996 Act entering into force, English courts have not entirely departed from the rules 
established under the identified cases, inasmuch as most of these principles were reflected in the 
statute.  Nonetheless, predicating on the fact that the right to appeal now lies with the 1996 Act, the 
courts suggested giving more weight to the provisions of the act. Consequently, the Court of Appeal in 
The Northern Pioneer58 supported the argument that English courts should no longer merely adhere 
to the rules in The Nema59 and The Antaios60, since they now need to be mainly guided by the 
statutory criteria under section 69 of the English Arbitration Act61. Taking this one step further, the 
court therein observed that the reference to “open to serious doubt” under the act is wider than the 
requirement of “strong prima facie case” established in The Nema, and therefore it leaves more room 
for the courts to grant permission to appeal62.  
 
Another criterion that needs to be met is that not only should the legal question referred to the court 
be one of those issues submitted to arbitration63, but also it needs to “substantially affect” at least one 
of the parties’ rights64. Nonetheless, difficulties arise in understanding the practical reason for the 
legislator to require this last condition, since what is just and proper requires a subjective and fact-
driven analysis. The English case law demonstrates that this criterion is for the courts to use their 
discretion in deciding whether a permission to appeal should be granted by considering what the 
parties sought to attain with the arbitration agreement. When it is obvious that parties wish to have a 
quick arbitration process, the courts will be not be inclined to allow appeal. Nor will there be a 
tendency on the part of the courts to grant permission where the applicant’s intention to delay the 
procedures is evident.    
 
Despite all the restrictions for allowing appeal on the point of law, it is striking that there is a serious 
judicial intervention to the arbitration process on the grounds that under section 69(7)(b) of the act, 
the courts are even vested with the right to vary the award. Even though the parties are entitled to 
                                                            
55 Ibid, 743 
56 Ibid 
57 Ipswich Borough Council v. Fisons plc, [1990] 1 All ER 730, 734 
58 [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 204 
59 1982] A.C. 724 
60 [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 235 
61 [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 204, 210 
62 Ibid. 
63 s. 69(3)(b) 
64 s. 69(3)(a) 
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contract out of the appeal mechanism, in light of the rules explained thus far, the default position 
under the English Arbitration Act surely undermines the efficiency of the arbitration process in terms 
of cost and duration.  
 
Consequently, in the final section whether the arbitration regime of the UK or that of the U.S. provides 
a quicker and less costly arbitration process will be discussed. 
  
SECTION 3 - CONCLUSION: WHICH ARBITRATION REGIME IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE 
SUBSTITUTE FOR LITIGATION? 
 
It is clear that the key provisions of the English Arbitration Act, 1996 and the U.S. Federal Arbitration 
Act manifest the difference between the intentions of the respective legislators. Accordingly, it is 
evident that the Federal Arbitration Act attaches more importance to ensure that the route to obtain a 
final and binding award does not cause parties unbearable costs and delays whereas, the English 
Arbitration Act demonstrates sensitivity on accuracy of the awards when the dispute is governed by 
English law. The impact of this dissimilarity between the jurisdictions on the parties is evident: When 
an arbitration award is subject to judicial review for error of law, parties may struggle in all level courts 
in order to enforce an award. This surely gives rise to increasing costs and delays. When the position 
is to the contrary, it becomes easier to obtain a final and binding award. 
 
As this is the case, when parties seek to have a quick arbitration, the arbitration regime adopted in the 
U.S pursuant to Federal Arbitration Act should be viewed as more attractive, inasmuch as judicial 
review in the U.S. is significantly restricted. The pre-Hall Street position was receptive to judicial 
review on point of law in highly exceptional circumstances, when there is a manifest disregard of law. 
However, the post-Hall Street position suggests that availability of the test, namely manifest disregard 
of law, has become doubtful, since many circuits have stood against resorting to this rule even in 
those unusual cases. 
 
Even though the intention to render arbitration cost and time effective can be justified, it is difficult to 
understand why the U.S. courts are hostile to judicial review on point of law when this is agreed as a 
ground in the arbitration agreement. In this respect, it can be argued that the English Arbitration Act is 
a better substitute for litigation, inasmuch as the parties have the right to contract out of the appeal 
mechanism.  
 
Nonetheless, the U.S. arbitration regime facilitates speedy and cost effective arbitration process, for it 
is in principle devoid of an appeal mechanism on the point of law. As will be recalled, following the 
dicta of the Supreme Court in Hall Street, the ground of “manifest disregard of the law”, can still find 
room for application. However, this ground only applies in exceptional circumstances, where the 
arbitrator goes so far as to intentionally refusing to apply the law. So far as English law is concerned, 
it is important to note that, despite the adoption of the right to appeal on point of law, the English 
Arbitration Act also envisages rules to prevent undue delays and increasing costs. These include the 
strict time bar for application to challenge the award, which is 28 days after the award is made, and 
not giving permission to appeal when there is merely a suspicion about the accuracy of the award on 
the point of law.  
 
In terms of assessing whether arbitration is an effective substitute for litigation, the degree of judicial 
intervention also needs to be considered. It is true to say that by agreeing to arbitrate the parties 
demonstrate their intention to be bound by the decision of the tribunal. The arbitration acts therefore 
should not frustrate this intention when there is no public importance in the resolution of the matter by 
the courts. Consequently, the Federal Arbitration Act envisages a more acceptable regime in two 
respects: Firstly, mere error of law on the part of the tribunal is not a ground for setting aside an 
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award. Secondly, the U.S courts do not apply the test of what would the court have decided, had the 
issue been litigated. Even though the arbitrator’s decision is only disturbed in case of evident error or 
where there is a public importance in clarifying the legal position, it is evident that the English 
arbitration act gives a considerably wider room for the courts to review the legal issues decided by the 
arbitrator.  
 
Having discussed the English and U.S. laws on arbitration, the observations above reinforce the 
argument that Federal Arbitration Act provides a better substitute for litigation. The parties are better 
positioned in the U.S. law, as there are very strict grounds for judicial review and this fact itself surely 
gives rise to a swift and inexpensive arbitration process. If speed and cost have heightened 
importance to parties who wish to choose England as the seat of arbitration, the only way to attain this 
objective would be to contract out the right to appeal for error of law envisaged under article 69 of the 
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